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The rise of the Tea Party movement followed a period during which 
many academic students of constitutional law focused on ―popular constitu-
tionalism‖: the involvement of public opinion and popular movements in 
influencing constitutional interpretation.1  Many of these scholars argue that 
popular constitutional movements have a beneficial impact on constitution-
al law,2 and some even contend that popular constitutionalism should sup-
plant judicial review entirely.3  At the very least, the last generation of 
constitutional scholarship has established that public opinion influences and 
significantly constrains judicial interpretation of the Constitution.4 
Most of the previous scholarship on popular constitutionalism focuses 





Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful suggestions and 
comments, I would like to thank Jonathan Adler, Jared Goldstein, participants in the 2011 AALS panel 
on the Tea Party and the Constitution, and the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review Col-
loquy.  I would also like to thank Eva Choi and Eric Facer for helpful research assistance. 
1
  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutio-
nalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 
(2006) (link); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1594 (2005) (link); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 
U. PENN. L. REV. 926 (2006) (link); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (link); Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001) (link); Larry D. 
Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001) (link); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (link). 
2
  See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 1 (arguing that popular constitutional movements have helped pro-
mote racial equality and gay rights), and Siegel, supra note 1 (arguing that the feminist movement 
helped to promote gender equality norms in constitutional law). 
3
  See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, and TUSHNET, supra note 1. 
4
  For a wide-ranging recent survey of the evidence reaching this conclusion, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
105: 300 (2011) The Tea Party Movement 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/12/ 301 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s,5 the feminist movement,6 and the gay 
rights movement.7  Although the Tea Party movement is primarily com-
posed of conservatives and libertarians, it has much in common with pre-
vious popular constitutional movements. 
Part I of this Essay describes some of these similarities, focusing on the 
ways in which popular constitutional movements have arisen in response to 
social or economic crises, or major policy initiatives instituted by their op-
ponents.  Part II explains how the Tea Party movement shares key strengths 
and weaknesses of other popular movements.  For example, public opinion 
on constitutional and policy issues is often influenced by widespread politi-
cal ignorance and irrationality.  There also tends to be a conflation of con-
stitutional and policy preferences.  The Tea Party is no exception to these 
trends.  The evidence suggests, however, that Tea Party supporters are no 
more likely to be ignorant than public opinion generally, or their opponents 
on the political left.  The proposals for constitutional reform advocated by 
the Tea Party have notable shortcomings.  But they cannot be simply dis-
missed as ridiculous or irrational products of ignorance.  Despite their 
flaws, the Tea Party movement and its predecessors serve a useful role as a 
check on the power of political elites. 
Part III explains two possible advantages of one unusual feature of the 
Tea Party—the fact that it is the first popular constitutionalist movement in 
many years whose main focus is the need to limit federal power.  The 
enormous size and scope of modern government undercuts meaningful 
democratic control over government policy because ―rationally ignorant‖ 
voters cannot keep track of more than a small fraction of government activi-
ty.  Strengthening democratic accountability is one of the main objectives 
of advocates of popular constitutionalism.  The imposition of stricter limits 
on government power might make that goal easier to achieve.  The Tea Par-
ty’s focus on limiting government also makes it less likely that we will see 
the emergence of a right-wing populist movement that is focused on into-
lerance and xenophobia, of the kind that often arose during previous eco-
nomic downturns. 
Ironically, the mostly right-wing Tea Partiers’ focus on limiting gov-
ernment could help advance two key objectives of mostly left-wing defend-
ers of popular constitutionalism: strengthening democratic accountability 
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I. THE TEA PARTY AS A POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT 
Popular constitutional movements have been a common feature of 
American political history.  The struggle over the ratification of the Consti-
tution,8 the political battle over slavery and its expansion into newly-
acquired western territories,9 the New Deal and the Great Depression,10 and 
the struggle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s all generated popular 
movements agitating for their preferred constitutional visions. 
There are some obvious commonalities between these movements and 
the Tea Party.  First, and most important, all of the movements listed above 
argued that major elements of their agenda were not only prudent and just, 
but mandated by the Constitution.  While arguing that that federal power 
should be rolled back for policy reasons, Tea Party activists also contend 
that the federal government has exceeded constitutional limits on its pow-
er.11 
Second, each of these movements has arisen in response to a political 
or economic crisis.  Strikingly similar to the above-noted response to the 
Great Depression, the Tea Party movement has emerged in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting deep recession.  Serious crises are 
more likely to focus attention on fundamental constitutional principles and 
lead activists to claim that things have gone wrong because those principles 
have been violated. 
Third, popular constitutional movements often arise in response to ma-
jor policy changes initiated by their political antagonists.  Thus, anti-
Federalists mobilized in opposition to the Federalist effort to ratify the Con-
stitution, abolitionists and the Free Soil movement arose in opposition to ef-
forts to expand slavery into newly-acquired territories, and constitutional 
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Deal.  The Tea Party emerged in large part as a response by conservatives 
and libertarians to the Obama Administration’s various initiatives to expand 
federal spending and regulation, especially the 2009 Stimulus Bill and the 
2010 Health Care Bill.12  Many of the Tea Party activists and leaders were 
also angry, however, about the growth of government that had begun under 
President George W. Bush, especially the TARP Bank Bailout Bill enacted 
in September 2008.13  Thus, the Tea Party has ideological origins that go 
beyond partisan opposition to President Obama and the Democrats.  Pre-
vious popular constitutionalist movements, of course, also often had ideo-
logical roots that went beyond immediate reactions to their opponents’ 
agendas.14 
The Tea Party’s claims that their adversaries’ policies are counter to 
the Constitution and American values are also far from unprecedented.15  
Both the critics and the defenders of slavery claimed that their opponents 
were violating the Constitution and going against the principles of the Dec-
laration of Independence and the American political tradition.16  Critics and 
defenders of New Deal constitutionalism made similar claims.17  More re-
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goals with fundamental American principles and their opponents’ goals 
with opposition to those principles, denouncing segregation as ―un-
American.‖18  Given the quasi-sacred status of the Constitution in American 
political culture,19 any suggestion that opponents’ major policies violate it to 
some extent brands them as enemies of the nation’s fundamental values. 
In many ways the Tea Party movement closely parallels previous epi-
sodes of popular constitutionalism.  It is far from clear, however, that it will 
be as effective as some of its more successful predecessors.  So far, it has 
not managed to create a broad political consensus behind its goals of the 
sort that eventually enabled the civil rights movement to succeed.  It is too 
early to say whether the Tea Party will have any major lasting impact. 
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF IGNORANCE AND POPULISM  
Because the Tea Party is a historically typical instance of popular con-
stitutionalism, it exemplifies some of the standard strengths and weaknesses 
of such movements.  Perhaps the most significant of the flaws is political 
ignorance.  Adherents of popular movements are usually not experts on 
constitutional law or public policy, and often lack extensive knowledge 
about these subjects.  This ignorance can lead public opinion to endorse se-
verely flawed and even dangerous ideas.  On the other hand, the Tea Party 
also exemplifies a major potential benefit of popular movements: their 
ability to serve as a check on the power of political elites. 
A. The Tea Party and Political Ignorance 
1. Are Tea Party Supporters Unusually Ignorant about Politics? 
For decades, public opinion researchers have found widespread politi-
cal ignorance in the American electorate.20  Majorities are often ignorant of 
very basic facts about politics and public policy.21  Recent surveys, for ex-
ample, show that only forty-six percent of adults know that the Republicans 
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election.22  Ignorance about basic aspects of the Constitution is also exten-
sive.  For example, fifty-eight percent of Americans cannot name the three 
branches of the federal government23 and only twenty-eight percent can 
name two or more of the five rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.24 
Widespread political ignorance clearly exists among Tea Party suppor-
ters as well.  For example, some thirty percent of self-identified Tea Party 
supporters believe the ―birther‖ claim that President Barack Obama was not 
born in the United States, a much higher figure than among all adults (twen-
ty percent).25 
At the same time, belief in comparably dubious political myths is 
common on the other side of the political spectrum.  A 2007 poll found that 
some thirty-five percent of self-identified Democrats believed that President 
George W. Bush knew about the 9/11 terrorist attacks in advance, and 
twenty-six percent were not sure if he did.26  Only twenty-two percent of the 
public as a whole endorsed the view that Bush had advance knowledge of 
the attacks.27  Additionally, a 2009 study found that thirty-two percent of 
Democrats believed that ―the Jews‖ deserve ―a moderate amount‖ or ―a 
great deal‖ of blame for the financial crisis of 2008, compared to eighteen 
percent of Republicans who endorsed the same sentiments.28 
As these statistics show, political ignorance is common on both sides 
of the political spectrum, and both sides are prone to embrace misinforma-
tion that confirms their preexisting views.29  The ubiquity of political ignor-
ance is in part due to the fact that devoting little or no effort to acquiring 





  Public Knows Basic Facts About Politics, Economics, but Struggles with Specifics, PEW 
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http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208577,00.html (link). 
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  Americans’ Awareness of First Amendment Freedoms, MCCORMICK TRIBUNE FREEDOM 
MUSEUM, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.freedomproject.us/files/pdf/survey_results_report_final.pdf (link). 
25
  See Stephanie Condon, Poll: ―Birther‖ Myth Persists Among Tea Partiers, All Americans, CBS 
NEWS, Apr. 14, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20002539-503544.html (citing N.Y. 
Times/CBS News, Polling the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/14/us/politics/20100414-tea-party-poll-
graphic.html?ref=politics#tab=1 (link)) (link). 
26
  22% Believe Bush Knew About 9/11 Attacks in Advance, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, May 4, 2007, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/bush_administration/22_believ
e_bush_knew_about_9_11_attacks_in_advance; see also Ilya Somin, An Inconvenient Truth: Political 
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the chance of any one vote influencing the outcome of an election is infini-
tesimally small, there is little or no incentive to become knowledgeable 
about politics if the only reason for doing so is to become a ―better‖ voter.30  
The rationality of widespread political ignorance helps explain why it has 
persisted for decades despite impressive increases in education levels and in 
the availability of information through various types of media.31  Although 
the cost of acquiring information has declined, thanks to modern technolo-
gy, it is still high enough to make it rational for most citizens to remain ig-
norant about most issues; the key constraint on political knowledge is not 
the availability of information, but voters’ willingness to spend time and 
energy learning and understanding it.32 
On balance, there is no evidence suggesting that Tea Party supporters 
are more ignorant than either the electorate as a whole or their political op-
ponents on the left.  It is even possible that Tea Party supporters have 
slightly higher levels of political knowledge than the general public.  Tea 
Partiers have higher income levels and are more ideologically extreme than 
the population as a whole.33 They may also have slightly higher education 
levels.34  Education, income, and relative ideological extremism are all as-
sociated with higher levels of political knowledge.35 
2. Tea Party-Backed Proposals for Constitutional Change 
Another possible way to gauge the degree of political knowledge in the 
Tea Party movement is to consider the two constitutional reform proposals 
that have gained the most support in Tea Party circles: the Repeal Amend-
ment and the effort to abolish the Seventeenth Amendment, thereby elimi-





  The theory of rational political ignorance was introduced by ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 (1957).  For recent defenses and extensions of the theory, see BRYAN 
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007); 
SOMIN, supra note 21, at chs. 3–4; Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the 
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  For a detailed discussion of this point, see SOMIN, supra note 21, at ch. 4. 
32
  See id. at chs. 2, 4, (surveying the evidence in detail). 
33
  Some eighty-one percent of Tea Party supporters have incomes about $30,000 per year, and fifty-
five percent above $50,000, compared to seventy-five percent and fifty percent respectively among the 
population as a whole.  About seventy percent of Tea Party supporters identify themselves as ―conserva-
tive,‖ and only twenty-two as moderate, compared to thirty-eight percent of the general population who 
say they are ―moderate.‖  See Lydia Saad, Tea Partiers Are Fairly Mainstream in Their Demographics, 
GALLUP, Apr. 5, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/127181/tea-partiers-fairly-mainstream-
demographics.aspx (link). 
34
  A March 2010 Gallup survey found nearly identical education levels between Tea Party suppor-
ters and the general population.  Id.  However, an April 2010 CBS News/New York Times poll found that 
some seventy percent of Tea party supporters have had at least some college education, which is slightly 
higher than the percentage in the general population (65% according to the Gallup study).  The Tea Par-
ty Movement: Who They Are, CBS NEWS, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_tea_party_who_they_are_041410.pdf (link). 
35
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turn out to be particularly foolish or obviously based on misinformation, 
that would be some indication that the Tea Party agenda is the product of 
greater-than-average levels of political ignorance. 
Developed by Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett and endorsed 
by a variety of Tea Party leaders and Republican politicians,36 the Repeal 
Amendment would allow a vote of two-thirds of the states to repeal any 
federal statute or regulation.37  In my view, the Repeal Amendment would 
have only a very modest, albeit positive, impact if enacted.38  Given the 
great difficulty of assembling a two-thirds majority of states to oppose a 
measure popular enough to be approved by both houses of Congress and 
signed by the President, the Amendment is likely to be used only in very 
unusual cases where Congress greatly runs afoul of public opinion.39  For 
that reason, the amendment is unlikely to result in any substantial rollback 
of federal power.  At the same time, however, it very modesty undercuts 
critics’ claims that it will somehow cause great harm or undermine the Con-
stitution.40  And it would have the effect of making it marginally more diffi-
cult for Congress to pass laws that generate widespread public opposition.  
Whether or not the Repeal Amendment is a good idea, it is difficult to cha-
racterize it as the result of either ignorance or irrationality. 
The same conclusion applies to efforts to repeal the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which mandates that senators be popularly elected rather than 
chosen by state legislatures,41 as under the original Constitution.42  The ar-
gument for repeal is based on the notion that senators chosen by state legis-
lators are more likely to resist the expansion of federal power than 
popularly elected ones.43  In my view, such expectations are misplaced.  
Most states already chose senators by popular election even before the Se-
venteenth Amendment was enacted, and senators chosen by state legisla-





  See Randy E. Barnett & William J. Howell, The Case for a ―Repeal Amendment‖, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703466704575489572655964574.html 
(link); Matthew Boyle, Constitutional Amendment Proposal to Streamline Legislative Repeals to Hit 
Congress Soon, THE DAILY CALLER, Nov. 20, 2010, http://dailycaller.com/2010/11/20/constitutional-
amendment-proposal-to-streamline-leglislative-repeals-to-hit-congress-soon/ (link). 
37
  See Barnett & Howell, supra note 36. 
38
  See Ilya Somin, Reflections on the Repeal Amendment, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Dec. 3, 2010, 
http://volokh.com/2010/12/03/thoughts-on-the-repeal-amendment/ (link). 
39
  See id. 
40
  For an example of such claims, see Dana Milbank, A Strange Way to Honor the Founding Fa-
thers, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/01/AR2010120105576.html (link). 
41
  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (link). 
42
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (link). 
43
  See, e.g., Gene Healy, Repeal the 17th Amendment?, WASH. EXAMINER, June 8, 2010, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11876 (link); Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth 
Amendment, NAT’L REV., Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/252825/repeal-
seventeenth-amendment-todd-zywicki (link). 
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just as much as popularly elected ones.44  The combination of these two fac-
tors makes it unlikely that repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would 
lead to any meaningful new limits on federal power. 
 Be that as it may, it would be wrong to dismiss proposals to repeal the 
Seventeenth Amendment as ridiculous or irrational.  It is difficult to defini-
tively rule out the possibility that repeal would reinvigorate the Senate as a 
constraint on federal power.  My colleague Todd Zywicki, a leading Seven-
teenth Amendment scholar, is among those advocating its repeal.45 
If the Tea Party’s constitutional reform proposals deserve criticism, it 
is in large part because they are unlikely to have any major effect if enacted.  
And, like all proposed constitutional amendments, the odds against their 
ever being ratified are steep.  Even so, they do not seem to be products of 
ignorance. 
One can argue about whether the ideas embraced by the Tea Party 
movement are correct or not.  But its agenda is not driven by voter ignor-
ance among Tea Party supporters above and beyond that which exists 
throughout the electorate as a whole. 
B. Checking the Power of Political Elites 
Despite its weaknesses, which are typical of popular constitutionalist 
movements, the Tea Party does have at least one important virtue.  It, like 
many of its predecessors, is a potentially useful check on the power of polit-
ical elites—those members of government who make and interpret the laws.  
If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and its interpretation is 
left solely up to political elites in the courts, Congress, and the Executive 
Branch, the practical result would be elite dominance of a political system 
unconstrained by public opinion.  Given the incentive of elites to use politi-
cal power for their own benefit at the expense of the public, this would be a 
dangerous state of affairs. 
Even those skeptical that popular constitutionalism should displace 
judicial review46 can acknowledge that it can usefully play a more limited 
role in constitutional politics.  Judges and other elites with specialized ex-
pertise in constitutional interpretation have valuable roles of their own.  But 
their power should not be left unchecked by the public. 
The need for popular constraints on elite discretion is particularly im-
portant with respect to constitutional issues relating to the scope of federal 
power—the main focus of Tea Party activists’ attention.  Federal officials in 
Congress and the Executive Branch have little if any incentive to constrain 





  See Ilya Somin, Would Repealing the Seventeenth Amendment Curb Federal Power?, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, June 11, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/06/11/would-repealing-the-seventeenth-
amendment-curb-federal-power/ (link). 
45
  See Zywicki, supra note 43. 
46
  For arguments of this type, see, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, and TUSHNET, supra note 1.  
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was dramatically illustrated during the first six years of the George W. Bush 
presidency, when the Republicans controlled both Congress and the White 
House.  Although the Party claimed to stand for limited government, in re-
ality it presided over massive expansions of federal spending and regula-
tion.47  In constitutional litigation, the Bush Administration defended nearly 
unlimited federal power—not only with respect to executive power over 
war and foreign policy, but also in cases addressing Congress’s power to 
engage in domestic regulation.48  The Bush record suggests that many Re-
publican Party elites are no more willing to accept constitutional restrictions 
on their authority than their Democratic counterparts, at least not when their 
party controls Congress and the White House. 
Given the extreme reluctance of political elites in either party to accept 
constraints on their power, popular movements focused on limited govern-
ment have a valuable role to play in enforcing such restrictions.  Whether 
the Tea Party can succeed in constraining the use of federal power is far 
from clear.  But at least it has focused attention on a crucial issue. 
III. THE TEA PARTY AS A MOVEMENT FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 
Despite its many similarities to previous popular constitutionalist 
movements, the Tea Party is unusual in one important respect: it is the first 
such movement in many years to focus its efforts primarily on limiting the 
power of the federal government.  Obviously, other recent constitutional 
movements have sought to limit exercises of federal power that threaten 
particular constitutional rights, such as the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms or the right to be free of race and gender discrimination.  But the Tea 
Party is unusual in focusing on structural constraints on federal power that 
go beyond restrictions on the violation of specific individual rights.  This 
focus has two important potential benefits different from those created by 
most other popular constitutionalist movements: it could strengthen demo-
cratic accountability and preclude the rise of a right-wing populist move-







  See, e.g., JOHN SAMPLES, THE STRUGGLE TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT 215–44 (2010) (documenting 
expansion of government during the Bush era); MICHAEL D. TANNER, LEVIATHAN ON THE RIGHT: HOW 
BIG-GOVERNMENT CONSERVATISM BROUGHT DOWN THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION (2007) (same). 
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  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–33 (2005) (endorsing the administration’s position 
that Congress has virtually unlimited authority to regulate any activity) (link); see also Ilya Somin, Gon-
zales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 
(2006) (discussing sweeping implications of Raich) (link).  The administration advocated similarly 
broad interpretations of federal power in other cases.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federal-
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(discussing several examples of such broad interpretations) (link). 
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A. The Growth of Government and the Loss of Democratic Accountability 
Limiting federal power could help strengthen democratic control and 
accountability over the use of government power.49  Even before the explo-
sion of government spending and regulation that occurred in the wake of 
the financial crisis of 2008, government spending accounted for 36.8% of 
GDP in 2007 and 38.8% in 2008.50  By 2009, federal spending alone had 
risen to some twenty-five percent of GDP.51  In addition, the federal gov-
ernment now regulates nearly every aspect of our economy and society.52  
From 2000 to 2010, federal regulatory spending rose over seventy-five per-
cent in real terms.53 
State government spending and regulation have also risen, albeit to 
much smaller levels.  But state and local governments are to some extent 
held accountable through ―foot voting‖ as well as ballot box voting.  Citi-
zens who dislike the policies of the state or locality where they live can of-
ten ―vote with their feet‖ and move elsewhere.  For example, millions of 
African-Americans moved from the South to the North in the early twen-
tieth century in order to live under less racially intolerant state govern-
ments.54  More recently, there has been extensive migration towards states 
with economic policies that promote greater growth and lower taxes.55  Rel-
ative to ballot box voters, foot voters have stronger incentives to acquire re-
levant political knowledge, since their decisions on where to live are 
decisive.  An individual can decide to move without needing the agreement 
of an electoral majority.  In this way, foot voting decisions differ profound-





  See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1 (arguing that government and interpretation of the Constitution 
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  Country Statistical Profile: United States 2010, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-united-states-2010_20752288-2010-
table-usa (last updated May 27, 2010) (link). 
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  Historical Table 1.3—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current 
Dollars, Constant (FY 2005) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940–2016, OFF. OF MGMT. & 
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sand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE 
INST., 2010 (link).  A 2005 study by the Small Business Administration found that federal regulation 
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  Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, A Decade of Growth in the Regulators’ Budget: An Analysis of 
the U.S. Budget for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, 32 REGULATORS’ BUDGET ES, (2010) (link). 
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  See Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 202, 215–21 (2011) (link). 
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  See Elda Pema, Do State Taxes Affect the Migration of Human Capital? (2009) (unpublished 
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niscule chance of influencing the outcome.56  Unfortunately, foot voting has 
little impact as a constraint on the federal government, since the costs of 
emigration are vastly higher than those of moving from one state or locality 
to another. 
Given rational political ignorance, it is virtually impossible for voters 
to understand and keep track of more than a small fraction of today’s mas-
sive federal government.  Even a much better informed electorate than we 
currently have would probably be unable to do it.  As a result, there is little 
meaningful democratic control over much federal activity.57  Strengthening 
democratic accountability requires a reduction in the size, scope, and com-
plexity of government, particularly at the federal level.  We can recognize 
the importance of this problem for democratic accountability even if we are 
skeptical of the Tea Party’s particular proposals for solving it. 
The scope of government power is an issue where the need for popular 
constraints on elite discretion is particularly great.58 
B. Preventing the Growth of More Dangerous Forms of Populism 
Historically, severe economic downturns have stimulated the rise of in-
tolerant and xenophobic populist movements, often increasing public hostil-
ity to foreigners and racial, ethnic, or religious minorities.59  It is easy and 
psychologically satisfying for rationally ignorant voters to blame their eco-
nomic troubles on foreigners or disliked minority groups.  The available da-
ta suggests that voters have a strong ―anti-foreign bias‖ in their policy 
views even during normal times.60 
It would be naive to imagine that such beliefs are completely absent 
among Tea Party supporters.  For example, support for the Tea Party is cor-
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60
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Polling the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/14/us/politics/20100414-tea-party-poll-
graphic.html?ref=politics#tab=6 (link). 
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vocated a greater focus on such issues.62  Nonetheless, Tea Party leaders 
have tried hard to keep the movement focused on limiting federal power 
and away from traditional social conservative issues such as opposition to 
gay rights, abortion, and immigration.63  Indeed, social conservatives have 
expressed fears that the Tea Party has become too libertarian as a result.64  
The Tea Party ―Contract From America,‖ perhaps the most widely publi-
cized statement of the movement’s agenda, includes no social conservative 
proposals among its ten points, and does not even mention such issues as 
immigration, gay marriage, or abortion.65  The recent January 2011 inaugur-
al meeting of the Senate’s Tea Party Caucus also avoided these issues in fa-
vor of focusing on cutting government spending.66  While social 
conservatism is by no means necessarily synonymous with intolerance or 
xenophobia, some social conservative positions do tap into such sentiments 
among voters, particularly opposition to immigration and gay rights. 
Tea Party leaders have also tried hard to attract support from ethnic 
and religious minorities, and feature various minority speakers at their 
events.67  Even if some of this emphasis on diversity is a matter of political 
strategy rather than principle, it still reduces the likelihood that the move-
ment will move in an intolerant or xenophobic direction. 
Although the majority of Tea Party supporters are self-described con-
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CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-
Wires/2011/0128/Tea-Party-Caucus-in-Senate-very-small-very-enthusiastic (noting focus on ―deficit 
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  See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Tea Party Outreach Courts Jews, POLITICO, Sept. 13, 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42068.html (noting that ―Tea Party activists have long hig-
hlighted whatever involvement of racial and ethnic minorities there is in the movement‖ and have tried 
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may be seen as libertarian concerns.69  An April 2010 New York Times/CBS 
News poll found that seventy-eight percent of self-described Tea Party sup-
porters believed that ―economic issues‖ are the more important issues fac-
ing the country, compared to only fourteen percent who said ―social issues‖ 
are more important.70 
Moreover, survey data suggests that many Tea Party supporters are 
more socially tolerant than expected.  An exit poll conducted by Politico at 
a major April 2010 Tea Party rally in Washington, D.C. found that fifty-one 
percent of those surveyed believe that ―Government should not promote 
any particular set of values,‖ while forty-six percent endorsed the more so-
cially conservative view that ―Government should promote traditional fami-
ly values in our society.‖71  It is, of course, possible that committed 
movement activists who show up at rallies are more tolerant than less active 
Tea Party supporters in the general population.  But the former probably 
have disproportionate influence over the development of the movement’s 
agenda. 
The New York Times/CBS News survey of Tea Party supporters found 
that forty percent believe that Supreme Court’s decision protecting abortion 
rights in Roe v. Wade was a ―good thing‖ and fifty-seven percent support 
either marriage rights (sixteen percent) or civil unions (forty-one percent) 
for ―gay couples.‖72 
To the extent that the Tea Party movement succeeds in focusing right-
wing populist energy on limiting the power of government, it makes it less 
likely that the current economic crisis will lead to the rise of a much more 
dangerous right-wing populist agenda.  Even opponents of the Tea Party’s 
limited government agenda should welcome this aspect of its activism. 
Of course, the Tea Party movement could still veer off in directions 
different from its current focus.  Even if it does not, it might be supplanted 
by other right-wing populist groups that are much more intolerant or xeno-
phobic.  So far, however, it seems to have channeled populist energies in a 
more healthy direction than many of the available alternatives.  Given the 
virtual inevitability that a right-wing populist movement of some kind 
would emerge during the current recession, this should be considered a pos-
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CONCLUSION 
The Tea Party is in many ways a typical popular constitutionalist 
movement.  As such, it exemplifies some of the standard strengths and 
weaknesses of such movements, including widespread political ignorance. 
At the same time, the evidence suggests that Tea Party supporters are no 
more ignorant than other voters, including those on the political left.  More-
over, the Tea Party’s unusual focus on limiting federal power could poten-
tially create some important benefits. 
The ultimate impact of the Tea Party on American constitutionalism 
remains to be seen.  The movement could fade away, be co-opted by the 
Republican Party leadership, or veer off in a more socially intolerant direc-
tion.  For now, the evidence shows only that the Tea Party is very much in 
the same tradition as previous popular constitutionalist movements.  And its 
focus on limiting federal power could have some major beneficial effects. 
